The Rediff Special/Colonel Anil A Athale (retd)June 09, 2004
On the eve of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, I was posted in Punjab. My battalion of Gorkhas was located at Ambala and had the task of defending a section of the border north of Amritsar.
I had never been to the Golden Temple and took the first opportunity to visit the shrine. Being a compulsive smoker, I had a packet of cigerettes on me. At the entrance itself I was told to deposit the packet in the locker and then go ahead.
During my first visit to this holiest Sikh shrine, I heard the shabad kirtan (devotional songs) being sung from the first floor of the Harmandir Sahib. Being an avid fan of Indian classical music, for me it was a treat to listen to some of the finest music, that too free.
From this time onwards, whenever I was passing through Amritsar I made it a point to visit the Golden Temple and spend some time there. It was always a rewarding experience.
It was quite common to see, at that time, that Hindu visitors to the Golden Temple far outnumbered Sikhs on a normal day. In my army days most of my close friends were Sikhs and therefore one was quite familiar with Sikh rituals and often visited gurdwaras as a matter of course on Sundays.
But less than 13 years later, I found myself again in Punjab, this time on the unpleasant duty of dealing with terrorists who thought that pulling out Hindus from buses and gunning them down mercilessly was their highest religious duty. As a participant in the painful but necessary Operation Bluestar, I can vouch that when General K Sundarji said that the Indian Army entered the Golden Temple with a prayer on its lips, he echoed the sentiments of all of us.
Today, when the memory of those nightmare years seems distant, there is an attempt to give a very different colour to the whole episode. Gulzar did that quite effectively with his film Maachis. The tragic consequences of that were seen in the suicide of a Sikh police officer (former Tarn Taran superintendent of police A S Sandhu) who had dealt with terrorism. It is therefore time for all Indians to understand the truth that led to a ten-year bloodbath in Punjab and not attempt to glorify the terrorists under the garb of human rights.
Most analysts agree that the troubles in Punjab began with the Nirankari-Sikh clash that took place on April 13, 1978, in Amritsar. The Nirankaris are a heretic cult that violates the basic tenets of Sikhism and yet claims to be part of the Panth. Forty protesters died in that clash and a feeling spread that the government was supporting the Nirankaris. It is noteworthy that at that time Punjab was being ruled by the Akalis. The violent movement that began initially as an anti-Nirankari agitation soon turned against the government and, later, Hindus.
The origins of the Punjab crisis and Sikh separatism go back to the British days. As in the case of Muslims, giving Sikhs a separate identity, not religious but political, was a part of the divide and rule policy. But the trauma of the partition of Punjab did much to wash off that myth and the Sikhs returned to the Indian mainstream.
The Akalis often used the slogan of 'Sikh Panth in danger' (not unlike the Muslim League's equally false and disastrous slogan of Islam in danger!) to garner votes, but consistently failed in their attempts. Sikhs, by the dint of sheer hard work, prospered and came to occupy a dominant position in many fields, including in the armed forces. A distinction needs to be clearly made between a distinct religious identity and political separatism based on religion.
Why then did Punjab erupt in the 1980s?
Several explanations have been offered. Some attributed it to the deprivation of the masses in spite of the Green Revolution. Others felt that the Akali frustration at their inability to attain political power (as the SC/ST Sikhs and Hindus combined to support the Congress) was at the root of the violence. Machinations by Indira Gandhi, who was credited with having deliberately created Sikh militancy to gather frightened Hindu votes, has also been floated as a serious theory.
But none of these explanations suffices to understand the widespread support that militancy enjoyed at its peak. To understand this phenomenon, one has to go back to the decade of the 1960s and the Green Revolution.
In 1965, when the US effectively used food aid to browbeat India, Indira Gandhi and her dynamic minister in charge of food and agriculture, C Subramaniam, fashioned a strategy to attain food self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time frame. The irrigated lands of Punjab, Haryana, and Western Uttar Pradesh were targeted for application of miracle seeds, fertilizers and mechanisation.
The strategy succeeded and India became self-sufficient in foodgrain. But rising incomes and mechanisation brought in their wake social tensions.
In the hard work that intensive agricultural operations involved, the turban and the beard were seen as a hindrance. Sikhs in large numbers took to trimming or even shaving their beards and cutting their hair, both against the tenets of the Khalsa (pure) Panth. The hair and the beard are not mere external symbols for a Sikh, but a major part of his identity.
Worse, many took to smoking, a taboo in the Sikh ethos. A district like Amritsar, which has a majority Sikh population, became the highest revenue-earning district for cigarette companies. 'Paani piyo pump da te cigarette piyo Lamp da' was a catchy slogan that linked the smoking of Red Lamp cigarettes with water from the 'pump', subtly linked this symbol of the Green Revolution with smoking.
In travels through Punjab as an army officer, one was always welcomed with open arms. It was also common to share the charpoy and lassi with the farmers. During all these encounters, one frequently heard a lament from Sikh elders that at the rate at which people were deserting the faith, in a few years there would be no Sikhs left in Punjab.
The relationship between Sikhs and Hindus was such that the moment a Sikh shaved his beard and cut his hair, he became a Hindu. Sikh society felt insecure at the assault of this 'modernisation' and feared for the survival of its identity. This feeling was not confined to the villages but was commonplace even among the Sikh intelligentsia.
In this situation of fear and foreboding arrived Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale with his single-point programme of strict adherence to the Sikh symbols. His campaign against trimming of hair and shaving of beards found a groundswell of support amongst the Sikh masses. And he enforced his dictates with ruthless force.
His violent methods brought him into direct confrontation with the State and soon militancy began in Punjab.
But 'modernisation', the real threat, is a formless entity. So the violence first targeted the Nirankaris, then the government machinery, and then the Hindus. In the final stages, the terrorists turned increasingly against the Sikhs themselves and became predatory. It is at this stage that the militants lost support and were finally overcome towards 1993.
The situation was tailormade for Pakistan. It intervened with a generous supply of arms and ammunition and mayhem began in right earnest. The US and the UK also saw in this an opportunity to destabilise India, their long-term goal during the Cold War. The West used expatriate Sikhs as an instrument of its policy and gave shelter and support to all manner of terrorist groups.
Indira Gandhi saw this as a direct challenge to India's very existence and eventually decided to act, leading to Operation Bluestar. The rest, as they say, is history.
There is an uncanny resemblance in this to the Islamist terrorism that the world is witnessing today. Like Sikhism then, Islam today is afraid of modernisation and Westernisation. This also explains the wide support terrorists enjoy in the Muslim world. Osama bin Laden is a spitting image of Bhindranwale.
Like Sikh terrorism, the current wave of Islamist terror will subside once the terrorists turn predatory (as their recent attacks in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan indicate) and lose popular support. Only then will the world be able to deal with this modern scourge. Punjab does offer a valuable lesson.
Image: Uttam Ghosh
Operation Bluestar, 20 Years On
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Recent Specials
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The Rediff Specials
Saturday, December 13, 2008
cont..........
The Rediff Interview/Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar (retired)June 04, 2004
Lieutenant General (retired) Kuldip Singh Brar commanded Operation Bluestar 20 years ago, when the Indian Army entered the Golden Temple to remove the terrorists who had turned the Sikhs' holiest shrine into a private bunker. It was one of the Indian Army's most difficult operations, and undoubtedly the most controversial.
In the second part of a four-part interview with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji, General Brar looks back at the compulsions that forced him to send his men into the Temple:
Part I: 'Pakistan would have recognised Khalistan and crossed the borders'
Were you given a timeframe within which to act?
The fastest possible. When I met my CO [commanding officer] Lieutenant General K Sundarji [then General Officer Commanding, Western Command; he later became Chief of Army Staff] at Chandimandir [in Chandigarh], he told me he would fly down in 48 hours to hear my first briefing. Time was at a premium.
So we moved all night and got our forces into Amritsar and then the Temple.
What about a siege to flush out the militants?
A siege is easily spoken of. A siege is only effective when you are able to make the people under siege unable to continue to stay under siege. That means they have no water, no food, no electricity, no ammunition and are forced to surrender or to capitulate.
But, in the Golden Temple, there is no shortage of water. There are any number of wells; besides there is the Sarovar [the Holy Lake on the premises of the Temple]. There are a number of generators. There is no shortage of food -- every day, thousands of devotees flock to the Temple bringing with them food and provisions, so there is enough food to feed a few hundreds of thousands of people for over a month [food is served free of cost to the devotees every day in the Golden Temple; this food is made from offerings by the devotees], and here we are talking of forcing the hand of a few thousands…
The other problem of a siege was that, once laid, word would have spread to the hinterland within 24 hours. Every villager in Punjab would be told the Golden Temple was under siege. In those days, every rumour or fact was exaggerated; such messages are sent out emotionally, thus surcharging the atmosphere. People would have picked up their swords or lances and hundreds of thousands would have converged on Amritsar and the Golden Temple and besieged the army that was besieging the Temple! We can't fire at these people, and we can't surrender, so what are we to do? We didn't want such a situation to arise.
After asking the militants to surrender [on June 5], we waited and waited. It soon became 8 o'clock, then 9 o'clock and was nearing 10 o'clock. We were worried. We had to finish the operation before dawn [around 5.30 am] for fear of mobs amassing around the Temple. The news would spread fast that we hadn't cleared out the militants, then we would be under siege. People must understand these things.
It is very easy to say to we could have laid siege, we could have postponed it for a day or two, or carried out the operation without the loss of life. It is only we, who were there at that time, who know what our limitations and needs were. Our soldiers went into what you would call a death trap. They had no cover, they were out in the open [when moving from the entrances to the various rooms and sections where the militants were hiding]; in contrast, the militants had barricaded every window and were heavily armed…
So ultimately you had to finish off the operation in 48 hours, because you feared Pakistan coming in?
That was the biggest fear. It had to be a surgical operation and one that caused the minimum damage with least loss of blood but it had to be as quick as possible because once word got around, there would have been a flood of people… like the Brahmaputra. When the Brahmaputra floods, there is nothing you can do. No amount of sandbags can stop the flood.
What about the innocent pilgrims inside?
We were to go in at 7 pm [on June 5]. Since afternoon, we used the public address system to keep asking those who were inside to surrender. We told them we don't want to come in, we pointed out that there were pilgrims inside, there were women and children inside, and we told the militants that if they want to fight it out, do so but for God's sake to at least send the pilgrims, the old, the young, out safely. But until 7 pm, nothing happened.
I asked the police if they could send emissaries inside to help get the innocent people out, but the police said that anyone sent inside would not come out again. They said the militants were no doubt keeping the pilgrims as a sort of trump card, believing their presence would stop the army from coming in. Eventually, about 100 sick and old people were let out, but not the rest. They told us the others were not being allowed to come out.
I feel sorry for the innocent people who died in the crossfire.
In the fight, you were dealing with a former superior, Major General [retired] Shahbeg Singh [a highly decorated army officer who, after being dismissed from service for financial irregularities, became a close accomplice of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale].
Yes, and he knew something was up because the day before, I had walked around the Golden Temple in civilian clothes and seen the militants and the barricades. And he saw me taking my rounds so he knew something was up. We had gone into Bangladesh together.
Was he a formidable enemy?
He was a very seasoned soldier who won the Mahavir Chakra [India's second highest bravery award in war] in 1971, who had to leave the army for whatever reason. He was a highly emotional person and had joined with Bhindranwale. Perhaps he believed that with the pilgrims inside, the Indian Army would not come in but he never realised there is always a limit to how much any country can take.
How difficult was the operation?
It was in the middle of the night. One cannot see and one is out in the open and under fire from the militants holed up behind barricades. Plus I was constantly screaming at the men inside that come what may, they were not to fire in the direction of the Harmindar Sahib [the sanctum sanctorum where the Sikh holy book, the Guru Granth Sahib, is kept during the day] and that even if there was fire from that side they were not to return fire. Later, there were a couple of bullet holes in the Harmindar Sahib, which could have been the militants' fire or odd stray fire from the soldiers. Otherwise there was no damage to the Harmindar Sahib.
Even at the Akal Takht [seen above], there would have been no damage. Our soldiers tried to lob stun grenades [which release gas that momentarily stuns people without causing any collateral damage]. But the Akal Takht was completely sealed and there was no way to lob the stun grenades inside. And when our soldiers were crawling towards the Akal Takht for some commandos to get in, they were being mowed down by enemy fire. They were being killed by the dozen, it was a terrible sight.
As you know Bhindranwale had shifted to the first floor of the Akal Takht. How did the Sikhs allow that? It was against the religion's tenets. The Akal Takht is where the Guru Granth Sahib [the Sikh holy book] is kept at night after being taken from the Harmindar Sahib. No one is allowed to stay above the Guru Granth Sahib, but Bhindranwale and his immediate accomplices were living on the Akal Takht's first floor.
The members of the SGPC [the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee which has managerial control of the Golden Temple and other gurdwaras in India] were living elsewhere in the Temple. They had long lost control of the situation and had no say in what was happening. The writ of Bhindrawale ran not just in the Golden Temple or in Amritsar but throughout Punjab.
Why were the tanks brought in?
Tanks were brought in late to illuminate the Akal Takht, so that the soldiers could see where they were going and to momentarily blind the militants in the glare of the lights. Those who have seen these huge halogen lights know these lights fuse in 20, 30 seconds, so the tanks had to keep going in and coming out. It was not an easy task at all.
Next: 'You are not acting against any religion but against a section of misguided people'
ALSO SEEPart I: 'Pakistan would have recognised Khalistan and crossed the borders'
Image: Rajesh Karkera
Operation Bluestar, 20 Years On
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The Rediff Interviews
Lieutenant General (retired) Kuldip Singh Brar commanded Operation Bluestar 20 years ago, when the Indian Army entered the Golden Temple to remove the terrorists who had turned the Sikhs' holiest shrine into a private bunker. It was one of the Indian Army's most difficult operations, and undoubtedly the most controversial.
In the second part of a four-part interview with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji, General Brar looks back at the compulsions that forced him to send his men into the Temple:
Part I: 'Pakistan would have recognised Khalistan and crossed the borders'
Were you given a timeframe within which to act?
The fastest possible. When I met my CO [commanding officer] Lieutenant General K Sundarji [then General Officer Commanding, Western Command; he later became Chief of Army Staff] at Chandimandir [in Chandigarh], he told me he would fly down in 48 hours to hear my first briefing. Time was at a premium.
So we moved all night and got our forces into Amritsar and then the Temple.
What about a siege to flush out the militants?
A siege is easily spoken of. A siege is only effective when you are able to make the people under siege unable to continue to stay under siege. That means they have no water, no food, no electricity, no ammunition and are forced to surrender or to capitulate.
But, in the Golden Temple, there is no shortage of water. There are any number of wells; besides there is the Sarovar [the Holy Lake on the premises of the Temple]. There are a number of generators. There is no shortage of food -- every day, thousands of devotees flock to the Temple bringing with them food and provisions, so there is enough food to feed a few hundreds of thousands of people for over a month [food is served free of cost to the devotees every day in the Golden Temple; this food is made from offerings by the devotees], and here we are talking of forcing the hand of a few thousands…
The other problem of a siege was that, once laid, word would have spread to the hinterland within 24 hours. Every villager in Punjab would be told the Golden Temple was under siege. In those days, every rumour or fact was exaggerated; such messages are sent out emotionally, thus surcharging the atmosphere. People would have picked up their swords or lances and hundreds of thousands would have converged on Amritsar and the Golden Temple and besieged the army that was besieging the Temple! We can't fire at these people, and we can't surrender, so what are we to do? We didn't want such a situation to arise.
After asking the militants to surrender [on June 5], we waited and waited. It soon became 8 o'clock, then 9 o'clock and was nearing 10 o'clock. We were worried. We had to finish the operation before dawn [around 5.30 am] for fear of mobs amassing around the Temple. The news would spread fast that we hadn't cleared out the militants, then we would be under siege. People must understand these things.
It is very easy to say to we could have laid siege, we could have postponed it for a day or two, or carried out the operation without the loss of life. It is only we, who were there at that time, who know what our limitations and needs were. Our soldiers went into what you would call a death trap. They had no cover, they were out in the open [when moving from the entrances to the various rooms and sections where the militants were hiding]; in contrast, the militants had barricaded every window and were heavily armed…
So ultimately you had to finish off the operation in 48 hours, because you feared Pakistan coming in?
That was the biggest fear. It had to be a surgical operation and one that caused the minimum damage with least loss of blood but it had to be as quick as possible because once word got around, there would have been a flood of people… like the Brahmaputra. When the Brahmaputra floods, there is nothing you can do. No amount of sandbags can stop the flood.
What about the innocent pilgrims inside?
We were to go in at 7 pm [on June 5]. Since afternoon, we used the public address system to keep asking those who were inside to surrender. We told them we don't want to come in, we pointed out that there were pilgrims inside, there were women and children inside, and we told the militants that if they want to fight it out, do so but for God's sake to at least send the pilgrims, the old, the young, out safely. But until 7 pm, nothing happened.
I asked the police if they could send emissaries inside to help get the innocent people out, but the police said that anyone sent inside would not come out again. They said the militants were no doubt keeping the pilgrims as a sort of trump card, believing their presence would stop the army from coming in. Eventually, about 100 sick and old people were let out, but not the rest. They told us the others were not being allowed to come out.
I feel sorry for the innocent people who died in the crossfire.
In the fight, you were dealing with a former superior, Major General [retired] Shahbeg Singh [a highly decorated army officer who, after being dismissed from service for financial irregularities, became a close accomplice of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale].
Yes, and he knew something was up because the day before, I had walked around the Golden Temple in civilian clothes and seen the militants and the barricades. And he saw me taking my rounds so he knew something was up. We had gone into Bangladesh together.
Was he a formidable enemy?
He was a very seasoned soldier who won the Mahavir Chakra [India's second highest bravery award in war] in 1971, who had to leave the army for whatever reason. He was a highly emotional person and had joined with Bhindranwale. Perhaps he believed that with the pilgrims inside, the Indian Army would not come in but he never realised there is always a limit to how much any country can take.
How difficult was the operation?
It was in the middle of the night. One cannot see and one is out in the open and under fire from the militants holed up behind barricades. Plus I was constantly screaming at the men inside that come what may, they were not to fire in the direction of the Harmindar Sahib [the sanctum sanctorum where the Sikh holy book, the Guru Granth Sahib, is kept during the day] and that even if there was fire from that side they were not to return fire. Later, there were a couple of bullet holes in the Harmindar Sahib, which could have been the militants' fire or odd stray fire from the soldiers. Otherwise there was no damage to the Harmindar Sahib.
Even at the Akal Takht [seen above], there would have been no damage. Our soldiers tried to lob stun grenades [which release gas that momentarily stuns people without causing any collateral damage]. But the Akal Takht was completely sealed and there was no way to lob the stun grenades inside. And when our soldiers were crawling towards the Akal Takht for some commandos to get in, they were being mowed down by enemy fire. They were being killed by the dozen, it was a terrible sight.
As you know Bhindranwale had shifted to the first floor of the Akal Takht. How did the Sikhs allow that? It was against the religion's tenets. The Akal Takht is where the Guru Granth Sahib [the Sikh holy book] is kept at night after being taken from the Harmindar Sahib. No one is allowed to stay above the Guru Granth Sahib, but Bhindranwale and his immediate accomplices were living on the Akal Takht's first floor.
The members of the SGPC [the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee which has managerial control of the Golden Temple and other gurdwaras in India] were living elsewhere in the Temple. They had long lost control of the situation and had no say in what was happening. The writ of Bhindrawale ran not just in the Golden Temple or in Amritsar but throughout Punjab.
Why were the tanks brought in?
Tanks were brought in late to illuminate the Akal Takht, so that the soldiers could see where they were going and to momentarily blind the militants in the glare of the lights. Those who have seen these huge halogen lights know these lights fuse in 20, 30 seconds, so the tanks had to keep going in and coming out. It was not an easy task at all.
Next: 'You are not acting against any religion but against a section of misguided people'
ALSO SEEPart I: 'Pakistan would have recognised Khalistan and crossed the borders'
Image: Rajesh Karkera
Operation Bluestar, 20 Years On
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The Rediff Interviews
terrorism......issues,bluestar operation,interview in rediff
The Rediff Interview/Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar (retired)June 03, 2004
When military officers retire, they move into what the armed forces euphemistically call 'civilian areas,' where the likes of you and me live. But when Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar retired, he had to reside in the cantonment area of Mumbai, in a bungalow guarded by a huge black gate, with army soldiers and policemen on watch round the clock.
Brar is probably the most protected army officer today, in service or retired. And all because one fateful night, 20 years ago, the then major general commanded Indian Army soldiers who entered the Golden Temple.
Operation Bluestar, as the mission was called, to flush out militants from the holiest Sikh shrine [on par with the Vatican for Catholics and the Kaaba for Muslims; the Hindu faith has no single equivalent to the Golden Temple] remains till date one of the military's most difficult missions.
The army had been ordered to destroy the movement to create Khalistan and to cleanse the Golden Temple of all the militants hiding there, including the leader of the militants, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.
June 6 marks the 20th anniversary of Operation Bluestar, the codename for the operation to enter and capture, dead or alive, the militants and terrorists who had turned the Golden Temple into their fortress.
At his home in Mumbai, the retired general agreed to journey back to that difficult time in an interview with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji. The first of a four part interview to understand the logic behind the Indian Army's most controversial operation.
Twenty years later, how do you look back on Operation Bluestar?
I look back in sorrow that it had to happen.
Apparently, the government had no other recourse. The events in Punjab had reached a complete breakdown.
The Sikh militants were in total control of the state machinery. There was a strong feeling that Khalistan was going to be established at any time. [Jarnail Singh] Bhindranwale was being seen as a prophet; he was making very strong speeches against [the then prime minister] Indira Gandhi and non-Sikhs; and trying to send a message across to the rural areas that the Sikhs are being given second-grade treatment and that it is high time we formed our own independent state of Khalistan. There was a strong possibility of Pakistan helping them and I think there was the possibility of a Bangladesh being repeated.
I can't comment on the inside of politics, but I assume that after taking everything into consideration, the prime minister and the government decided this was the only course of action left if we were to keep this country together, to prevent its fragmentation, to prevent Khalistan. And having seen reports of about 2,000 militants inside [Amritsar's Golden Temple] with any number of machine guns, different types of weapons, it was clearly beyond the capabilities of the police force to flush out the militants from the Golden Temple; the task had to be entrusted to the Army.
As a soldier, if I am given an order, I obey it and 20 years later, all I can say is I wish the situation had never risen that such an order had to be passed. And God forbid we have to do it again.
How did you motivate the soldiers?
No soldier enjoys or cherishes taking up arms against his fellow citizens. But they also know that there are many situations, be it in Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Punjab or Kashmir, where the Army has to be called in. When the Army is called in, we don't think about of religion, caste, creed, ethnicity; we are sworn to the Constitution of India, our primary role is to safeguard the national security of the country and we have to act on orders to do so.
Why did the army go in just after Guru Arjan's martyrdom day, when the number of devotees is much higher?
That was a coincidence. You must try and understand that perhaps the government had just about three or four days to carry out the operation. We had some sort of information that Khalistan was going to be declared any moment. You try and figure out that one fine day, Bhindranwale declares Khalistan and hoists the Khalistan flag...
The Khalistani currency had already been distributed; Pakistan was pumping in money, they wanted a strong part of India, which is Punjab, to secede and for India to disintegrate.
Can you imagine if one fine day Khalistan has been declared, what would have happened? Pakistan would have recognised Khalistan and crossed the borders to support Khalistan, like we did in Bangladesh. The Punjab police might have crossed over to support Bhindranwale...
Did you fear that happening?
Of course! After all, emotions then were very high. I am not saying that the entire Punjab police would have crossed over, but a large section might have. If there could be desertions in the army, then the police, who were in Punjab, who were privy to Bhindranwale's speeches, might have [also deserted]; they were also emotionally charged by what was happening.
Moreover, Hindus and non-Sikhs were leaving Punjab while Sikhs in Delhi and Haryana were moving to Punjab, causing further fear and apprehension. The law and order situation in such a case would have been beyond the police force and difficult for the Army.
Would we have been on the border to stop Pakistan? Would we have been working on maintaining law and order with huge migrations underway? Would we be disarming the police and militia for fear that they might go over to the other side?
It would have been a task well beyond the army. So whether we could have waited a few days is something the politicians can best answer. But the impression given to us was that we had very little time.
Next: 'There is always a limit to how much any country can take'
Photograph: Jewella C MirandaImage: Rajesh Karkera
Operation Bluestar, 20 Years On
When military officers retire, they move into what the armed forces euphemistically call 'civilian areas,' where the likes of you and me live. But when Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar retired, he had to reside in the cantonment area of Mumbai, in a bungalow guarded by a huge black gate, with army soldiers and policemen on watch round the clock.
Brar is probably the most protected army officer today, in service or retired. And all because one fateful night, 20 years ago, the then major general commanded Indian Army soldiers who entered the Golden Temple.
Operation Bluestar, as the mission was called, to flush out militants from the holiest Sikh shrine [on par with the Vatican for Catholics and the Kaaba for Muslims; the Hindu faith has no single equivalent to the Golden Temple] remains till date one of the military's most difficult missions.
The army had been ordered to destroy the movement to create Khalistan and to cleanse the Golden Temple of all the militants hiding there, including the leader of the militants, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.
June 6 marks the 20th anniversary of Operation Bluestar, the codename for the operation to enter and capture, dead or alive, the militants and terrorists who had turned the Golden Temple into their fortress.
At his home in Mumbai, the retired general agreed to journey back to that difficult time in an interview with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji. The first of a four part interview to understand the logic behind the Indian Army's most controversial operation.
Twenty years later, how do you look back on Operation Bluestar?
I look back in sorrow that it had to happen.
Apparently, the government had no other recourse. The events in Punjab had reached a complete breakdown.
The Sikh militants were in total control of the state machinery. There was a strong feeling that Khalistan was going to be established at any time. [Jarnail Singh] Bhindranwale was being seen as a prophet; he was making very strong speeches against [the then prime minister] Indira Gandhi and non-Sikhs; and trying to send a message across to the rural areas that the Sikhs are being given second-grade treatment and that it is high time we formed our own independent state of Khalistan. There was a strong possibility of Pakistan helping them and I think there was the possibility of a Bangladesh being repeated.
I can't comment on the inside of politics, but I assume that after taking everything into consideration, the prime minister and the government decided this was the only course of action left if we were to keep this country together, to prevent its fragmentation, to prevent Khalistan. And having seen reports of about 2,000 militants inside [Amritsar's Golden Temple] with any number of machine guns, different types of weapons, it was clearly beyond the capabilities of the police force to flush out the militants from the Golden Temple; the task had to be entrusted to the Army.
As a soldier, if I am given an order, I obey it and 20 years later, all I can say is I wish the situation had never risen that such an order had to be passed. And God forbid we have to do it again.
How did you motivate the soldiers?
No soldier enjoys or cherishes taking up arms against his fellow citizens. But they also know that there are many situations, be it in Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Punjab or Kashmir, where the Army has to be called in. When the Army is called in, we don't think about of religion, caste, creed, ethnicity; we are sworn to the Constitution of India, our primary role is to safeguard the national security of the country and we have to act on orders to do so.
Why did the army go in just after Guru Arjan's martyrdom day, when the number of devotees is much higher?
That was a coincidence. You must try and understand that perhaps the government had just about three or four days to carry out the operation. We had some sort of information that Khalistan was going to be declared any moment. You try and figure out that one fine day, Bhindranwale declares Khalistan and hoists the Khalistan flag...
The Khalistani currency had already been distributed; Pakistan was pumping in money, they wanted a strong part of India, which is Punjab, to secede and for India to disintegrate.
Can you imagine if one fine day Khalistan has been declared, what would have happened? Pakistan would have recognised Khalistan and crossed the borders to support Khalistan, like we did in Bangladesh. The Punjab police might have crossed over to support Bhindranwale...
Did you fear that happening?
Of course! After all, emotions then were very high. I am not saying that the entire Punjab police would have crossed over, but a large section might have. If there could be desertions in the army, then the police, who were in Punjab, who were privy to Bhindranwale's speeches, might have [also deserted]; they were also emotionally charged by what was happening.
Moreover, Hindus and non-Sikhs were leaving Punjab while Sikhs in Delhi and Haryana were moving to Punjab, causing further fear and apprehension. The law and order situation in such a case would have been beyond the police force and difficult for the Army.
Would we have been on the border to stop Pakistan? Would we have been working on maintaining law and order with huge migrations underway? Would we be disarming the police and militia for fear that they might go over to the other side?
It would have been a task well beyond the army. So whether we could have waited a few days is something the politicians can best answer. But the impression given to us was that we had very little time.
Next: 'There is always a limit to how much any country can take'
Photograph: Jewella C MirandaImage: Rajesh Karkera
Operation Bluestar, 20 Years On
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